A condição colocada pela Alemanha para o chamado 2º programa da tróica representa, pura e simplesmente, a ocupação da Grécia e a sua governação por um Comissário designado pela União Europeia, ou seja, pela Senhora Merckel. Na verdade, e segundo refere uma notícia publicada pelo “I” online, «O documento que defende a ocupação de Atenas foi divulgado pelo “Financial Times”. Está lá escrito que para ter acesso ao segundo programa de resgate, a Grécia terá de ser obrigada “a transferir a soberania nacional para a União Europeia, em matéria de orçamento, durante algum tempo”. O texto sugere que “um novo comissário do orçamento nomeado pelo eurogrupo ajudará a implementar reformas”. “O comissário terá largas competências sobre a despesa pública e um direito de veto contra decisões orçamentais que não estejam em linha com os objectivos orçamentais e a regra de dar total prioridade ao serviço da dívida."
Segundo a Reuters, esta tentativa alemã de governar Atenas pode ser estendida a outros países, como Portugal. Uma fonte do governo alemão disse à agência que esta proposta não se destina apenas à Grécia, mas a outros países da zona euro em dificuldades que recebem ajuda financeira e não são capazes de atingir os objectivos que acordaram.»
Para quem ainda invoca ter dúvidas sobre o que nos espera se não derrubarmos o actual Governo e não impusermos uma mudança de rumo ao País, aqui ficam o documento referido (retirado do próprio “Financial Times”) e uma previsão da OCDE.
Para quem ainda invoca ter dúvidas sobre o que nos espera se não derrubarmos o actual Governo e não impusermos uma mudança de rumo ao País, aqui ficam o documento referido (retirado do próprio “Financial Times”) e uma previsão da OCDE.
Assurance of Compliance in the 2nd GRC Programme
I. Background
According to information from the Troika, Greece has most likely missed key programme objectives again in 2011. In particular, the budget deficit has not decreased compared to the previous year. Therefore Greece will have to significantly improve programme compliance in the future to honour its commitments to lenders. Otherwise the Eurozone will not be able to approve guarantees for GRC II.
II. Proposal for the improvement of compliance
To improve compliance in the 2nd programme, the new MoU will have to contain two innovative institutional elements on which Greece will have to commit itself. They will become further prior actions for the second programme. Only if and when they are implemented, the new programme can commence:
1. Absolute priority to debt service
Greece has to legally commit itself to giving absolute priority to future debt service. This commitment has to be legally enshrined by the Greek Parliament. State revenues are to be used first and foremost for debt service, only any remaining revenue may be used to finance primary expenditure. This will reassure public and private creditors that the Hellenic Republic will honour its comittments after PSI and will positively influence market access. De facto elimination of the possibility of a default would make the threat of a non-disbursement of a GRC II tranche much more credible. If a future tranche is not disbursed, Greece can not threaten its lenders with a default, but will instead have to accept further cuts in primary expenditures as the only possible consequence of any non-disbursement.
2. Transfer of national budgetary sovereignty
Budget consolidation has to be put under a strict steering and control system. Given the disappointing compliance so far, Greece has to accept shifting budgetary sovereignty to the European level for a certain period of time. A budget commissioner has to be appointed by the Eurogroup with the task of ensuring budgetary control. He must have the power a) to implement a centralized reporting and surveillance system covering all major blocks of expenditure in the Greek budget, b) to veto decisions not in line with the budgetary targets set by the Troika and c) will be tasked to ensure compliance with the above mentioned rule to prioritize debt service.
The new surveillance and institutional approach should be formulated in the MoU as follows: “In the case of non-compliance, confirmed by the ECB, IMF and EU COM, a new budget commissioner appointed by the Eurogroup would help implementing reforms. The commissioner will have broad surveillance competences over public expenditure and a veto right against budget decisions not in line with the set budgetary targets and the rule giving priority to debt service.” Greece has to ensure that the new surveillance mechanism is fully enshrined in national law, preferably through constitutional amendment.
(Fonte: "Expresso")
(Publicado em Blog Garcia Pereira)
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